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Abstract
Metaphysical explanations, unlike many  other kinds of explanation, are stand-
ardly  thought to be insensitive to our epistemic situation and so are not evaluable 
by cognitive values such as salience. I consider a case study that challenges this 
view. Some properties are distributed over an extension. For example, the property 
of being polka-dotted red on white, when instantiated, is distributed over a sur-
face. Similar properties have been put to work in a variety of explanatory tasks in 
recent metaphysics, including: providing an analysis of change, giving to presentists 
truthmakers for past claims; giving to priority monists an account of basic hetero-
geneous entities; and giving to friends of extended simples an explanation of how 
an extended simple can enjoy qualitative variation. I argue that such explanations 
exhibit salience failure. How ought we represent the semantics of salience? Differ-
ences in linguistic stress induce semantic differences similar to the semantic differ-
ences induced in explanations by differences in salience, and I will draw an analogy 
with linguistic theories of focus sensitivity to sketch how one might model the role 
of salience in these kinds of explanations. I end with a few tentative conclusions 
about the role of cognitive values in metaphysical explanations. Some theorists view 
the citation of a ground as a sufficient explanation. If certain explanations appealing 
to distributed properties exhibit attenuated salience, then arguably the mere citation 
of a ground does not always provide an adequate explanation.
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‘Explanation’ is ambiguous between the reason something is so, and the act of con-
veying that reason. I will call the former a reason, and reserve explanation for the 
latter.1 The reason is a fact that obtains independently of our interests, purposes and 
background beliefs; independently of our representation of such facts; and indepen-
dently of the cognitive limitations that must be overcome for us to appreciate that 
such a fact is indeed a reason why something is so. An explanation, by contrast, is 
a linguistic activity sensitive to the epistemic situation of its participants. The inter-
ests, purposes, shared beliefs, modes of representation, and cognitive limitations of 
the interlocutors all influence the success of an explanation.
For me to succeed in conveying to you a reason why something is so, I must con-
sider our shared beliefs and intentions, and the currently available evidence. And I 
must take into consideration our limited abilities to recognize each other’s beliefs 
and intentions, to present and assess the evidence, and to follow the reasoning that 
leads us from our background beliefs and the presented evidence to a new belief. 
And so an act of explanation is evaluable by a range of cognitive values. For exam-
ple, ideological simplicity is a cognitive value since, all else being equal, explana-
tions with fewer primitive concepts are easier to understand than explanations with 
more. Similar comments could be made for such values as ontological parsimony, 
consistency with accepted beliefs, fecundity, predictive power, and salience.
Explanations come in a variety of kinds: causal explanations convey causal facts; 
epistemic explanations convey reasons to believe that something is the case, and so 
on. This is a paper about metaphysical explanations. To repeat a well worn example, 
in the Euthyphro Plato floats the claim that an act is loveable to the gods in virtue of 
its being pious. The relation between an act being pious and its being loveable to the 
gods is explanatory but it’s not one of a variety of common kinds of explanations. 
For example, the relation is neither causal nor a generalization: being pious neither 
causes, nor merely typically correlates with, being loveable to the gods. If metaphys-
ical explanations have the same structure as other explanations, then they convey 
facts about what grounds what—that is to say, facts about the relatively fundamen-
tal, and about how these fundamental facts determine facts about derivative enti-
ties—and this conveyance is evaluable by the range of cognitive values discussed 
above. The role of cognitive values in metaphysical explanations is an understudied 
topic. Indeed, it would be controversial to claim that metaphysical explanations are 
evaluable by cognitive values at all.
Some grounding theorists draw a distinction between grounds and metaphysi-
cal explanations. For example, Paul Audi (2012, pp. 687–688) argues for the exist-
ence of grounding relations on the basis of an analogy with the reason-explanation 
structure of causal explanations: “if we recognize [cases of non-causal explanation] 
and we agree that explanations require non-explanatory relations underlying their 
1 Some theorists make a similar distinction between the explanation and the backing relation underwrit-
ing that explanation. For example, Ruben (1990) draws this distinction in discussion of causal and scien-
tific explanations. Skow (2016) makes a similar distinction between the reason why and the explanation.
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correctness, then we are committed to recognizing a non-causal relation at work in 
these explanations.”2 Such an approach would allow for objective worldly facts to 
back explanations, while the explanations themselves might be sensitive to cognitive 
considerations.
Other grounding theorists, by contrast, view grounding as itself an explana-
tory relation. For example Kit Fine (2001, p. 15) writes: “We take ground to be an 
explanatory relation: if the truth that P is grounded in other truths, then they account 
for its truth; P’s being the case holds in virtue of the other truths’ being the case.”3 
Raven (2015) helpfully labels those who distinguish metaphysical explanations from 
the worldly facts which back such explanations separatists, and those who take 
grounding to be an explanatory relation unionists. The appearance of disagreement 
between separatists and unionists may arise only from the ambiguity of ‘explana-
tion’ and similar terminology. But if there is substantive disagreement, it may hinge 
on the nature of the explanation provided by the citation of a ground. Raven (2015, 
p. 326) characterizes this disagreement:
unionists might be inspired by … [an] analogy with cause and causal explana-
tion (cf. Strevens [2008]). Just as some kind of worldly explanation is given 
merely by citing what causes what, unionists might also say that so too some 
kind of worldly explanation is given merely by citing what grounds what. 
Unionists might then concede that this kind of explanation of ground needn’t 
satisfy just any of the explanatory interests or goals active in a given context 
without thereby undermining the legitimacy of the kind of explanation it does 
provide. If so, perhaps the burden is on the separatist to explain why ground 
itself provides not even this kind of explanation (whatever it is).
On this interpretation of unionism, the kind of explanation provided by grounding 
facts is independent of our epistemic situation. The grounding fact obtains, and so 
determines the grounded fact. That this is so, unionists might well hold, is suffi-
cient for some kind of explanation of the grounded fact. The mere citation of a fact 
is relatively insensitive to the interlocutors’ epistemic situation. Citation incurs the 
requirements of any assertion. Information will not be conveyed unless, for exam-
ple, known terminology is used. But provided these minimal prerequisites are met, 
citation is arguably not further evaluable by cognitive values such as salience and 
parsimony.
Raven poses a challenge to those like myself who would view metaphysical 
explanations as cognitively evaluable. In this paper I will consider, as a case study, 
a class of metaphysical explanations that arguably exhibit salience failure, and so 
attempt to meet this challenge.
A map of the paper may be helpful to the reader. I will begin by introducing 
our case study. Some properties are distributed over an extension. For example, the 
2 Others who make a similar distinction include Correia and Schnieder (2012), Koslicki (2012), Schaffer 
(2012) and Trogdon (2013). I do not claim that any of these authors view metaphysical explanations as 
cognitively evaluable, only that their approach allows the question of cognitive evaluation to be raised.
3 Others with similar views include Rosen (2010), Raven (2012), Dasgupta (2014) and Litland (2013).
 Synthese
1 3
property of being polka-dotted red on white, when instantiated, is distributed over a 
surface. Similar properties have been put to work in a variety of explanatory tasks in 
recent metaphysics, including: providing an analysis of change, giving to presentists 
truthmakers for past claims; giving to priority monists an account of basic heteroge-
neous entities; and giving to friends of extended simples an explanation of how an 
extended simple can enjoy qualitative variation. In these contexts, then, facts about 
properties that are distributed over an extension are cited to ground local features 
(§2). These explanations have met with criticism, and I will argue that the objections 
in the literature miss their target (§3). Rather, I will propose that these explanations 
exhibit salience failure. In brief, I will present salience as a psychological state, pos-
sessed by the interlocutors within a discourse, involving a certain kind of attention 
to a feature or state of affairs (this characterization will be unpacked in due course). 
Generally, explanations that draw on salient features of the reason why something is 
the case are, all else being equal, easier to follow, assess and appreciate, than those 
that do not. An explanation is more likely to succeed in conveying to the intended 
audience the reasons why something is the case, if it appeals to those very features 
of that reason to which the audience is attending. I will argue that certain metaphysi-
cal explanations that cite grounds exhibit attenuated salience (§4). How ought we 
represent the semantics of salience? Differences in linguistic stress induce seman-
tic differences relevantly similar to the semantic differences induced in explanations 
by differences in salience, and I will draw an analogy with linguistic theories of 
focus sensitivity to sketch how one might model the role of salience in these kinds 
of explanations (§5). Finally, I will draw a few conclusions about the role of cogni-
tive values in metaphysical explanations (§6). If certain explanations appealing to 
distributed properties exhibit attenuated salience, then arguably the mere citation of 
a ground does not always provide an adequate explanation, and so unionism is false. 
(I will also consider how an unionist might respond.)
2  Distributionalism
Some properties are distributed over an extension. For example, the property of 
being polka-dotted red on white, when instantiated, is distributed over a spatial 
extension. Introduced by Parsons (2000, 2004), such properties can be distributed 
over an extension in a variety of ways. For example, being red all over is a property 
which, when instantiated, is uniformly distributed over a surface. Being polka-dotted 
red on white is a colour property which, when instantiated, is non-uniformly distrib-
uted over a surface. And it seems that other properties can be distributed over times. 
Cameron (2011, p. 63) gives an example.
Consider a simple world consisting of just one spatial dimension and one tem-
poral dimension. There is one entity in this world—Flatty—who starts off his 
life at time t as a point, but who as time progresses grows continuously in one 
direction of the one spatial dimension he occupies. After the beginning of this 
life, then, he is no longer a point but a line; and at each moment he is a longer 
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line than he has ever been previously. Exactly one year later, at t*, Flatty tragi-
cally ceases to be, and the world is empty.
Flatty’s life might be described as instantiating a property distributed over time, 
from point to line segment. It will be useful to distinguish the underlying dis-
tributional property from its point features. Flatty has various lengths at different 
moments of his life. Each length is a point feature. Yet Flatty has one and the same 
distributional property at each moment of his life. To give another example, one 
might view my growing up as the distributional property of being initially a child 
and then an adult. Under commonly held endurantist assumptions, I had the point 
feature of being a child and now have the point feature of being an adult. But accord-
ing to the proposal at hand, I have now one and the same distributional property as I 
had then, a property of maturation distributed over time.
Many non-uniform distributional properties are equivalent to a set or arrange-
ment of non-distributional or uniform distributional properties. Consider being 
polka-dotted red on white. Parts of the surface are red and other parts, white. The 
surface is polka-dotted but, it may well seem, not in virtue of having some property 
over and above being red and white in a certain way. For one might think of the 
parts of the surface that are wholly red as having the uniform distributional property 
of being red all over and the parts of the surface that are wholly white as having the 
uniform distributional property of being white all over. Indeed, when we go down to 
point-sized parts of the surface, we reach non-distributional properties of being red 
and being white. So the property of being polka-dotted red on white appears to be 
equivalent to the non-distributional properties of being red and being white, along 
with a certain arrangement or spatial relationship.
Parsons (2004) however argues that at least some non-uniform distributional 
properties are irreducible—that is to say, some are not necessarily co-extensive with 
non-distributional or uniform distributional properties. The argument hinges on the 
extension, over which the property is distributed, being possibly gunky. Any part of 
gunk has itself proper parts. So gunk is divisible all the way down: gunk is not com-
posed of mereological atoms. For the classic discussion of gunk, see Lewis (1991). 
Many of the details of Parsons’ argument will not concern us,4 but I will next note 
that the employment of distributional properties within certain metaphysical expla-
nations requires that the relevant property is irreducible.
Distributional properties have been put to work in a variety of explanatory tasks 
in recent metaphysics, including: responding to the truthmaker objection to present-
ism5; providing an analysis of change6; giving to priority monists an account of 
basic heterogeneous entities7; giving to existence monists an explanation how the 
4 I discuss Parson’s argument only briefly—in part because the issue is peripheral to the salience objec-
tion, in part because one can simply stipulate that the distributional property is irreducible, and in part 
since I discuss the argument at length in Corkum (2014).
5 Cameron (2008, 2011, 2013); discussed in Caplan and Sanson (2011), Tallant and Ingram (2012a, b, 
2015), Cameron (2013), Effingham (2013), Davidson (2013), Corkum (2014), Green (2017).
6 Parsons (2000, 2004), Cameron (2008, 2011).
7 Cornell (2013, 2016).
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world, although mereologically simple, is heterogeneous8; and giving to friends of 
extended simples an explanation how an extended simple can enjoy qualitative vari-
ation.9 Let’s look in just a little more detail at a few examples where irreducible non-
uniformly distributed properties are put to philosophical use.
Our first example. Parsons (2004, pp. 178–180) and Cameron (2011, p. 77) pro-
pose an analysis of change in terms of properties non-uniformly distributed over 
time. Parsons (2004) proposes the following account of change: “an object changes 
iff it has a non-uniform temporal distributional property. More specifically, an object 
changes in a respect φ (where φ might be “heat”, or “mass”, or “believing in the 
Hegelian Dialectic”) iff it has a non-uniform temporal φ-distribution.” Cameron’s 
proposal occurs within his argument that a presentist may appeal to temporally dis-
tributed properties so to serve as truthmakers for past claims. Cameron considers 
an objection to his view, namely that distributional properties would themselves 
change. Cameron (2011, p. 77) responds to the objection in the following way.
It makes no sense to speak of an object changing its distributional properties. 
Why? Because what change is on the account being offered is to instantiate (at 
each moment of your existence) a nonuniform distributional property. Being 
red at one time and then orange at some later time, for example, is to be ana-
lysed as instantiating (at all times) the distributional property being red-then-
orange. To speak of an object changing its properties is a loose way of saying 
something about the distributional property it has that says how it is across 
time; it makes no sense to speak of an object gaining or losing the property 
that says how it is across time.
Distributional properties offer a novel analysis of change. According to this account, 
an object x changes just in case there is a property p and times t1 < t2 such that x is p 
at t1, x is p at t2, and p is suitably distributed over a temporal period including t1 and 
t2. So, consider the example of my standing up. I initially exhibit the point feature of 
being bent and subsequently, the point feature of being straight. But I do so in virtue 
of possessing one and the same property in both the initial and final states of the 
change—namely, the distributional property of being initially bent and then straight.
Notice that the success of the distributional analysis of change depends on the 
irreducibility of the distributional properties. If x’s point features of, say, being bent 
and being straight are to be explicated in virtue of x possessing one and the same 
property over time, being initially bent and then straight, then this distributional 
property ought not be analysable as an arrangement of these very point features.
Now our second example. Schaffer (2010a) advocates priority monism, the view 
that there is a single fundamental object, the world itself. The world has parts, but 
these parts are derivative. How explain basic heterogeneous entities? As Schaffer 
(2010a, p. 60 n. 39) notes, this issue of heterogeneity for the monist is analogous to 
8 On priority monism, Schaffer (2010a); discussed in Sider (2007, 2008), Morganti (2009), Trogdon 
(2009), Spencer (2010), Tahko and O’Conaill (2012), Kriegel (2012), Paul (2013), Tallant (2014), Eff-
ingham (2015), Schaffer (2016) and Brzozowski (2016).
9 Discussed by McDaniel (2009).
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the problem of intrinsic change—i.e., temporal heterogeneity—for enduring objects, 
discussed in the previous section. Schaffer prefers to explain heterogeneity by appeal 
to distributed properties. Schaffer (2010a, p. 60) writes:
For the monist, the general fact that the world is heterogeneous is due to the 
world’s instantiating the determinable property of being heterogeneous. The 
specific way that the world is heterogeneous is due to the world’s instantiat-
ing the determinate property of tracing such-and-such a curve through physical 
configuration space. Thus the one whole can be parturient.
Similar moves are offered by other theorists. Cornell (2013, 2016) defends the coun-
ter-intuitive position of existence monism, the view that there is only one entity, the 
world itself, which is mereologically simple—i.e., lacking proper parts.
Cornell appropriates the appeal to distributed properties so to provide an explana-
tion of heterogeneity. And McDaniel (2009) considers the application of distributed 
properties to extended simples. Such objects are mereologically simple but nonethe-
less spatially extended. How might an extended simple enjoy qualitative variation? 
We cannot say that the extension has distinct parts which instantiate different prop-
erties. Ascribing to the object a distributed property is an initially promising line for 
the friends of extended simples to explain qualitative variation.
Notice that Parsons’ strategy to argue for the irreducibility of distributed proper-
ties is not obviously available for existence monists, or friends of extended simples. 
Parsons, recall, draws on the possibility of gunk to establish irreducibility. But an 
extended simple lacks parts and so a fortiori is not gunky. Existence monists, simi-
larly, cannot say that the singular world is gunky due to the world’s mereological 
simplicity. There are options here. For example, one might hold that existence mon-
ism is merely contingently true. Under this modal qualification, existence monism is 
compatible with the claim that the world is possibly gunky. And friends of extended 
simples typically only claim that a mereologically simple yet extended object is pos-
sible. Alternatively, these theorists may simply stipulate that there are relevant irre-
ducible distributed properties. For example, Cameron (2008, 2011) appeals to dis-
tributed properties so to provide truthmakers for past claims; in response, Corkum 
(2014) argues that presentists lack an attractive non-stipulative defense of such an 
approach. Green (2017) defends this strategy of stipulation.
3  Objections to Distributionalism
Let’s call anyone who uses irreducible non-uniformly distributed properties in the 
manner of the previous section a distributionalist. I will next consider a few objec-
tions others have raised against distributionalism.
Our first objection. As we have seen, the friend of extended simples might 
explain qualitative heterogeneity by appeal to an irreducible, non-uniform distri-
butional property. In discussion of this view, McDaniel (2009) objects that how 
an object is here and now is determined by how things are elsewhere. McDaniel 
(2009, p. 330) writes:
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if distributional properties are fundamental, how an object is here or now is 
metaphysically determined by how things are elsewhere. But should not the 
local intrinsic features of an object at a region be determined by the proper-
ties that are located at (and only at) that region? It is probably question-beg-
ging to use this brute intuition against the friend of distributional properties, 
and it is in this context a bit odd, since a non-local determination of some 
local matters of fact might be congenial to the friend of extended simples. 
Existence monists, for example, might wish to embrace the global determi-
nation of all local matters of fact.
There is something to McDaniel’s objection that initially may appear to be wor-
rying for distributionalism generally. The explanation of a thing being straight 
by appeal to a property of being initially bent and then straight seems to draw 
features of the thing at other times into the explanation. The objection is not that 
there is no local determination on the distributionalist’s picture. How things are 
here and now is indeed determined by how things are everywhere—including 
here and now—in the presence of a specification of time and place. It is not that 
how things are here and now is left underdetermined by a property exemplified 
here and now (and is instead determined only by a property exemplified else-
where). Nor is there a problem of overdetermination, that the exemplification of 
a property elsewhere as well as the exemplification of a property here both deter-
mine how things are here and now. For one thing, it is the same property there 
and then as here and now.
Rather, McDaniel’s objection is that the local intrinsic features of an object at 
a region should be determined by properties located at and only at that region. I 
am not sure that I share McDaniel’s intuition that there is something unattractive 
about non-local determination. But regardless, as McDaniel notes, the distribu-
tionalist ought to reject the view. For it is partly constitutive of distributionalism 
that local features are determined globally.
Other objections suggest that the distributionalist property exhibits unattractive 
features as an explanation of the point features—for example, that the distributional-
ist reverses the appropriate direction of explanation or that the distributional prop-
erty provides an alleged explanation which fails to exhibit a formal feature required 
of explanations. For example, Sider (2007) raises an objection to the priority monist 
appealing to distributional properties so to explain qualitative heterogeneity among 
basic entities. Sider (2007, p. 3) writes:
Consider a world containing just a single computer screen with a 4x4 pixel 
resolution. Each pixel can be on or off. Since there are 16 pixels, and there are 
two states for each pixel,  216 states are possible for the entire screen. The exist-
ence of this state-space is common ground between monists and pluralists. But 
only the pluralist can give a satisfying account of why the state-space has  216 
members. The pluralist can say: the state-space has  216 members because (i) 
there are 16 pixels, each of which has two available fundamental states; (ii) 
the fundamental states of the system include only the states of the individual 
pixels; and (iii) the possibilities for the entire system are generated combinato-
rially from the entities in the system and the fundamental states those entities 
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can inhabit. The monist can tell no such story. For the monist, the fundamental 
properties are the members of the state-space itself: the  216 maximally specific 
properties of the entire screen. These properties are not generated combinato-
rially from more fundamental pixel-properties. Why, then, are there exactly  216 
of them?
Sider notes that there is an attractive explanation of the state-space in terms of the 
pixels, their states and certain combinatorial facts. Sider’s complaint appears to be 
that there’s available to the distributionalist no explanation of the state-space; their 
members are basic and inexplicable. But it is unclear to me why the fact that there 
is a 4 × 4 pixel grid, or two states for each pixel, ought to be more fundamental. 
The distributionalist can reverse-engineer the characterization of the screen as hav-
ing a 4 × 4 grid of pixels, each with two possible states. Indeed, given her theoretic 
commitments, the priority monist must say that the existence and states of the pix-
els is not among the fundamental facts of this world. The distributionalist does not 
aim to answer Sider’s question. Indeed, according to the distributionalist, there is no 
answer why there are  216 states: this fact is fundamental and is used to explain why, 
as derivative facts, there is a 4 × 4 grid with each pixel having two states.10
These two objections might be viewed as variations on the objection that distri-
butional facts fail to determine, or fail to adequately determine, the point feature 
facts. On this reading, each objection places some requirement on determination for 
determination to be explanatory—that the determination be local or exhibit some 
other desirable explanatory feature, such as a combinatorial explanation. The charge 
is that the distributional facts fail to determine the point features, or that they fail 
to satisfy some other requirement and so they do not determine the point features 
in a way that allows the distributional facts to explain the point feature facts. None 
of these charges would be compelling to the distributionalist. Yet the reader might 
share with me the feeling that there is some sense in which the distributional facts 
fail to explain the point features. The distributional facts are in some way at least 
partly otiose in the explanation of the point features. Although I have not shown that 
there is no restriction on determination that will capture this discomfort, I will next 
suggest a different tack.
10 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer, who suggests an alternative reading of Sider’s objection: “the plu-
ralist’s theory is explanatorily preferable [to the monist’s]: On the basis of just two possible states for 
each pixel and the fact that there is a 4 × 4 grid of pixels, the pluralist can explain the existence of all 
2ˆ16 possible states. But the monist must accept 2ˆ16 possible states in order to explain the existence of 
the grid and each pixel’s having two possible states. The monist’s explanans seems much more complex, 
in part because it has to accept many more unexplained possibility facts, i.e. for each of the  216 pos-
sible states, rather than just two possibility facts for each pixel.” I agree that there may be this additional 
objection to monism—interestingly, by appeal to the cognitive value of simplicity, in addition to the 
objection from salience failure which I will go on to present. And I do not suggest that salience failure 
is the only cognitive shortcoming of distributionalism. It is less clear to me that one ought to read Sider 
as endorsing this objection from simplicity, or prefer this reading to the one presented in the paper, on 




Let me take up a suggestion from Tahko and O’Conaill. Addressing the view that 
a colour property distributed over the surface of a ball can serve as the truthmaker 
for the claim that a given point on the ball’s surface has a certain colour, Tahko and 
O’Conaill (2012, [12] n. 19) write:
It is correct that different judgements can be made true by the same state of 
affairs (e.g., ‘The ball is red’ and ‘The ball is coloured’). However, the total 
condition of the ball is not appropriate to serve as the truth-maker, since it 
includes features which are irrelevant to either of the judgements under con-
sideration. This objection to coarseness applies, only far more strongly, to any 
appeal to the cosmos as the truth-maker of either of these judgements.
There is something that feels right about this line of objection in its broad strokes. 
For example, it seems that the property of being polka-dotted red on white offers 
much more information than is needed for specifying the feature of one spatial point 
as, say, red. But the problem is not coarseness, as I see it. Coarse-grainedness objec-
tions tend to charge a proposed explanans with failure to determine the specific 
details of the explanandum. For example, the criticized proposal may be a genus 
that fails to specify the differentia needed to pick out a species; or a determinable 
property that fails to specify a more determinate feature. The situation with distri-
butionalism is quite different. Although a distributional property appears to offer 
a surplus of information, it does not offer insufficiently detailed information. The 
distributional property does indeed determine, in the presence of a specification of 
time or place, the point features. And so the distributionalist is not vulnerable to 
a coarseness objection. Indeed, in this respect, Tahko and O’Conaill’s objection is 
akin to the objections made by McDaniel and by Sider: all three are variants of the 
mistargeted objection that the distributional facts fail to adequately determine the 
point facts.
Rather, I want to take up Tahko and O’Conaill’s suggestion that the shortcom-
ing of certain distributionalist explanations is due to something like a failure of rel-
evance. Some care is needed here. The term ‘relevance’ carries different meanings 
in different philosophical settings. But with the way I use ‘relevance’ and ‘salience’, 
distributional facts arguably fail to exhibit salience to, and not relevance for, explain-
ing the point facts. (I do not suggest that Tahko and O’Conaill use ‘relevance’ in my 
way.) So let me discuss the distinction between relevance and salience.
It might be helpful by beginning with an example of the role given to relevance 
in the epistemology literature. The reader is likely familiar with Dretske’s relevant 
alternatives theory of knowledge, on which knowledge requires ruling out relevant 
alternative possibilities. To know, when I visit the zoo, that I am looking at a zebra, 
I need to rule out the possibility that I am looking at an okapi, but I do not need to 
rule out the possibility that I am looking at a cleverly painted mule, since only the 
former possibility is typically relevant, given that zoos often have okapi but seldom 
if ever have painted mules. By contrast, to know that I am not looking at a cleverly 
painted mule, I must be able to rule out the possibility that I am looking at a cleverly 
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painted mule, since this possibility is relevant to my knowing that I am not looking 
at a cleverly painted mule. In motivating just now the contrast between relevant and 
irrelevant alternatives, I gestured towards what sort of animal is typically found in 
zoos. But it is difficult to give general guidance as to when a possibility is relevant. 
Partly for this reason, epistemologists such as Stine (1976), Cohen (1988, 1999) and 
Greco (2004) have viewed the distinction between relevant and irrelevant alterna-
tives to be mysterious, and have hoped to replace talk of relevance with a psycho-
logical distinction between what is and what is not salient to a speaker.
The psychological state of taking a certain feature or state of affairs to be sali-
ent is not simply attending to that feature or having that state of affairs in mind. 
To stay a moment longer with our epistemological example, I can attend to the 
possibility of there being painted mules at the zoo, without thereby taking that 
possibility to be salient to the question whether I know I am looking at a zebra, if 
I take that possibility to be sufficiently remote. The psychological state of view-
ing a state of affairs as salient to my knowledge is rather a judgment that that 
state of affairs plays a significant role in the warrant for holding my belief. I may 
rightly view the possibility of there being painted mules at the zoo as playing no 
such role, and my taking this possibility to be not salient is partly due to my hold-
ing this view. By contrast, the possibility that I am instead looking at an okapi is 
salient to my knowing that I am looking at a zebra in part because the presence of 
okapi in zoos is not unusual, and so my belief is warranted only if I can rule out 
this possibility. The salience of this possibility is partly constituted by my recog-
nition of this justificatory role.11
The distinction between what is salient and what is not salient to interlocu-
tors is already required to model ordinary discourse, independently of the spe-
cial demands the linguistic act of explanation places on semantics. For example, 
as Stanley (2005, pp. 19–20) notes, salience can be used to fix the domain of 
restricted quantifiers. Suppose a speaker, looking into the fridge, utters ‘There’s 
no beer!’ The restricted domain of the quantifier is determined by what domain 
the speaker has in mind. Similar appeals to the psychological states of the inter-
locutors determine the set of discourse referents resolving anaphora,  as when 
you arrive at the party and say to me ‘He’s not here!’ Sometimes these semantic 
features can be inferred from the linguistic context of an utterance, or by extra-
linguistic facts not involving the psychological states of the interlocutors. If the 
speaker is looking into the fridge while uttering ‘There’s no beer!’, the intended 
domain restriction is clear. Or if your utterance at the party occurs after I ask you 
if Freddy is here, the referent for your use of ‘he’ is transparent. But sometimes, 
11 For the observation that such salience is not mere attention, see Hawthorne (2004, p. 64), who charac-
terizes a salience constraint on knowledge in terms of taking certain possibilities of error seriously. One 
might wonder why recognition is important here. The possibility of okapi would be salient even if the 
observer didn’t recognize either the possibility or its justificatory role. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer 
for the objection. In response, notice that salience, unlike relevance, is a psychological state partly consti-
tuted by attention and, for the reasons rehearsed above, partly constituted by recognition of a certain role. 
In the okapi case, the possibility of okapi might be relevant to justification but, if the ascriber does not 
attend to the possibility and recognize its role in justification, the possibility is not salient.
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the context in which the utterance is made, and the previous statements in the dis-
course in which the utterance occurs, are insufficient to fix restricted domains or 
resolve anaphora. In such cases, features may only be determined by the psycho-
logical states of the interlocutors. The speaker of the first utterance has a domain 
in mind, the objects in the fridge; and moreover she views this set as the domain 
over which the quantifier in the utterance ranges. Similarly, the speaker of the 
second utterance has an individual in mind as the person being talked about. In 
these cases, a set of objects is salient to the speaker and it is this psychological 
state, the state of attending to the set with the intention of delimiting a domain or 
providing a set of discourse referents, that fixes the restricted domain of the quan-
tifier or resolves anaphora.12
So rather than introducing a new distinction between what is relevant and what 
is irrelevant, and facing the challenge of providing a principled general basis for 
such a distinction, let us instead draw on the distinction between what is salient 
and what is not salient to a speaker, a distinction that is reasonably familiar and 
one which we already need for semantics. With this in mind, I return to our dis-
cussion of explanation.
One area where the value of salience for explanations is discussed is in the lit-
erature on causal explanation. So let me draw on this analogy between metaphysi-
cal explanation and causation. There are differences between metaphysical expla-
nation and causation—metaphysical explanation involves a synchronic relation 
between facts; causation arguably involves a diachronic relation between events—
but analogies between metaphysical explanation and causation can be fruitful. In 
the causation literature, salience is sometimes drawn on in an account of why 
certain purported causal stories are not explanatory. To give an example, consider 
the claim that a sugar cube dissolves in a certain liquid because the liquid is holy 
water. A purported explanation such as this claim typically fails salience require-
ments. In most situations where one aims to explain the dissolution of the sugar 
cube, the interlocutors would neither attend to the water’s ecclesiastical status, 
nor take this status as a prominent component of the causal role of the water.
But the notion plays a role in a wide variety of explanations, including ascrip-
tions of praise and blame, and mathematical proofs.13 I will give just one further 
example. Feinberg (1970) views salience as playing a key role in moral praise and 
blame. To blame or praise is to ascribe causal responsibility—this requires not to 
relate the full causal story of how some action takes place, but to identify a par-
ticularly important part of the causal story. Feinberg argues that it is the habitual 
character of the agent which is what is salient for their moral blameworthiness. 
Feinberg’s account is applicable to other kinds of praise and blame—for example, 
athletic achievements. We praise the athleticism of the outfielder who makes a 
12 One might respond that salience plays only an epistemic role—what (constitutively) determines con-
tent is the speaker’s intention. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for the objection. In response, notice 
that what objects are salient to the interlocutors partly contributes to the intentions and so partly deter-
mines the content of what is said.




spectacular running catch, but not the equally capable outfielder who trips and 
has the ball fall in his glove by chance. Feinberg’s discussion suggests that this 
is because it is the athletic ability of the first outfielder which is salient to our 
ascription of praise. By contrast, it is the luck of the second outfielder which is 
salient to our withholding praise.
Now consider the case of distributional properties. The reason that the irreduc-
ible, non-uniform distributional properties arguably make poor explanations for 
the points features is that the distributional property appears to exhibit attenuated 
salience. For example, consider our toy example of the irreducible property of 
being polka-dotted red on white employed as explanans in an explanation of a 
given red surface point. While there is an aspect of the property of being polka-
dotted red on white which is salient for explaining what this surface point is the 
colour that it is—red, say—there are other aspects of the property which are not 
salient. On the whole, the property scores low for salience because its dominant, 
distinctive or prominent feature is not redness but the pair of colours (white, red) 
and the arrangement (polka-dotted). These features are idle in the explanation of 
the redness of a given red surface point. And in a purported explanation of the 
local redness by appeal to the surface being polka-dotted red on white, the inter-
locutors would not attend to the reference to redness in the explanans as hav-
ing special significance to the explanation. Similarly, facts about global proper-
ties distributed over an extension give to presentists truthmakers for past claims; 
give to priority monists an explanation of basic heterogeneous entities; and give 
to friends of extended simples an explanation of how an extended simple can 
enjoy qualitative variation—but all these explanations arguably exhibit attenuated 
salience.
The objection that a distributed property lacks salience and so is ill-suited to 
explain point features is distinct from any of the objections considered previously. 
For example, the charge of salience-failure is not the complaint that the distrib-
uted property is under-determined or unattractively determined, that the distrib-
uted property is insufficiently fine-grained, or that the distributed property fails to 
conform to requirements of locality.14
14 Thanks to anonymous reviewers who offered alternatives or alterations to distributionalism, to meet 
the objection against the position raised in the paper. For example, one reviewer questions whether there 
are views that are not subject to a salience failure objection – such as an explanation that appeals to a 
determinable property (being polka-dotted red on some colour or other) or an explanation that appeals 
to Schaffer’s contrastivist construal of grounding (being polka-dotted red, as opposed to some other col-
our, on white). Although this may not have been the intentions of the reviewer, note that determinables 
exhibit features similar to focus sensitive characterizations (being polka-dotted  [red]F on white). How-
ever, modelling salience on analogy with determinable features has the potential to mislead, since dis-
tributional facts are fully determinate, and determinable features typically would not be taken to ground 
determinate features; of course, I do not claim that the reviewer is misled on these points. Similarly, 
contrastivist explanations induce features similar to focus sensitive characterizations. But questions of 
salience arise for contrastivist approaches: I doubt that the surface being polka-dotted red, as opposed to 
some other colour, on white, provides a more salient explanation of this point being red than the surface 
being polka-dotted red on white; but even if one holds that the former is more salient than the latter, it is 
an open question whether either explanation exhibits sufficient salience.
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5  Salience and An Analogy With Focus Sensitivity
How ought we to think of salience and is the distributionalist vulnerable to the 
charge of salience-failure? Here’s one way to develop an account of salience. Let’s 
continue the analogy between metaphysical explanation and causation. In the cau-
sation literature, many authors discuss causal differences. Lewis (1986) gives the 
following example. John’s saying hello must differ from John’s saying hello loudly, 
since only the former causes Fred to respond, and only the latter is caused by John’s 
tension. Some respond by arguing that causal differences such as in the John case 
adduce explanatory differences only, not differences in the individuation of causal 
relata. One way of cashing out this thought is by distinguishing causation and expla-
nation. For example, Davidson (1980) holds that while causation is an extensional 
relation that holds between coarse events, explanation is an intensional relation that 
holds between the coarse events under a description. Others, such as Anscombe 
(1975), take a causal ascription to be an intensional context. So John’s saying hello 
and John’s saying hello loudly are the same event but the one cannot necessarily 
be substituted salva veritate within a causal ascription. These responses allow the 
causal relata to be individuated more coarsely, while allowing that either causal 
explanations or causal ascriptions are finer grained.
The distributionalist might then retort to the charge of salience-failure as follows. 
What distributed property is instantiated is a coarse-grained fact which determines 
the facts about what point features are instantiated. It is for example the instantiation 
of an irreducible property of being polka-dotted red on white that determines that 
this point is red. But this fact plays a role in the explanation of a red point feature 
only under an emphasis or description. The fact that the whole surface is polka-
dotted red on white is the same fact as the fact that the whole surface is polka-dotted 
red on white, but it is that fact only under the former description that explains the 
fact that this point on the surface is red.
How might we cash out this idea? Here’s a suggestion: consider linguistic the-
ories of focus. Why turn to linguistics, when we’ve been doing metaphysics? We 
express metaphysical explanations with a fragment of a natural language such as 
English. The empirical study of the linguistic features of that fragment offers defea-
sible but prima facie evidence for developing a theory of metaphysical explanations. 
And even though the expression of a metaphysical explanation generally does not 
employ explicit focus markings, we will see that a theory of focus sensitivity pro-
vides structure analogous to salience. And so a detour into this linguistic theory will 
prove to be fruitful for our purposes.
Some expressions exhibit focus sensitivity. Truth conditions for sentences con-
taining these expressions vary according to what other part of the sentence is 
emphasized. Linguistic theories of focus study a wide range of expressions—exclu-
sives such as ‘only’, scalar additives such as ‘even’, non-scalar additives such as 
‘also’, quantificational adverb such as ‘always’, quantificational determiners such as 
‘many’, particularizers such as ‘for example’, and intensives such as ‘really’, among 
others. Consider an example with an exclusive, adapting an example given in Beaver 
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and Clark (2008, p. 53). I’ll follow the convention of indicating a focused constitu-
ent with a subscripted ‘F’.
(1) Kim only serves Sandy [Johnnie  Walker]F.
(2) Kim only serves  [Sandy]F Johnnie Walker.
The difference in emphasis renders (1) appropriate for answering the question, 
‘What does Kim serve Sandy?’ and (2) appropriate for answering the question, ‘To 
whom does Kim serve Johnnie Walker?’ Call the congruent question the Current 
Question. Such differences are partly pragmatic, since they rely on features such 
as intonation and contextual considerations that indicate the Current Question. But 
although pragmatically specified, the features that distinguish (1) and (2) are not 
cancelable implicatures but have robust effect on the truth conditions. For example, 
in the situation where Kim serves both Sandy and Matilda Johnnie Walker and no 
other drink, (1) is true and (2) is false.
Exclusives such as ‘only’ are attached to a prejacent proposition. For example, 
the prejacent for both (1) and (2) is.
(3) Kim serves Sandy Johnnie Walker.
Exclusives are scalar expressions. They are associated with an ordering of proposi-
tions from weaker to stronger. For example, (1) is associated with an ordering such 
as < Kim serves Sandy, Matilda and Vivian Johnnie Walker, Kim serves Sandy and 
Matilda Johnnie Walker, Kim serves Sandy Johnnie Walker > . Exclusives com-
ment on an overly strong expectation regarding the answer to the Current Question. 
The effect on the flow of information is to say that the strongest true answer is the 
prejacent.
Other expressions which exhibit focus sensitivity are non-scalar. For example, 
consider an additive such as ‘too’. Beaver and Clark (2008, p. 72) adapt an example 
from Kripke (2009):
(4) Tonight  [Sam]F is having dinner in New York, too.
(5) Tonight Sam is having dinner in [New  York]F, too.
Beaver and Clark (2008, p. 72) view (4.4) as congruent to the question Who is hav-
ing dinner tonight in New York? (4) is associated with a set of propositions of the 
form x is having dinner tonight in New York, with the variable domain ranging over 
other diners in New York. The additive conveys that this question has already been 
partly answered, with someone other than Sam also having dinner in New York, and 
so it is known to the interlocutors that one of these propositions is true. Similarly, 
(5) is congruent to the question Where is Sam having dinner tonight? and is associ-
ated with a set of propositions of the form Sam is having dinner tonight in x, with 
the variable domain ranging over places other than New York where Sam eats, and it 
is implied that at least one of these propositions is true.
Explanations can also be focus sensitive. Consider.
(6) This point is red because the surface is polka-dotted  [red]F on white.
(7) This point is red because the surface is polka-dotted red on  [white]F.
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Notice that here too focal differences have semantic effects. In the situation of our 
toy example, arguably, (6) is true and (7) is false. The analysis of focus sensitiv-
ity sketched above suggests that the effect of the focus is to define distinct Current 
Questions for the two because-clauses: for example, (6) might be appropriate for 
answering the question What colour are the polka-dots? and (7) might answer the 
question What colour is the background to the polka-dots? Associated with each 
Current Question is a class of possible answers. For example, (6) is associated with 
a set of propositions of the form the surface is polka-dotted x on white, with various 
colours in the domain of substitution for the variable. Explanatory expressions such 
as ‘because’ are non-scalar: like additives such as ‘too’ and unlike exclusives such as 
‘only’, the propositions associated with (6) are unordered.
The distributed property, being polka-dotted red on white, has explanatory force 
in the presence of the factors that determine where in the property’s configural path 
the red point lies. It is because the point occurs in the foreground of a polka-dot-
ted array, as opposed to occurring in the background, that a range of possible fore-
ground colours is salient; and it is because the foreground colour is red, as opposed 
to one of these other colours, that the point is red. The focus marking in (6) implies 
that it is understood among interlocutors that this point is within the foreground of a 
polka-dotted array. And so the embedded clause in (6) is explanatory of the relevant 
point feature. The focus marking in (7), by contrast, implies that it is understood 
among interlocutors that this point is within the background of a polka-dotted array; 
and so the embedded clause fails to be explanatory of the point feature.
The distributionalist who accepts a salience requirement on explanation might 
appeal to focus sensitivity along these lines, so to show that distributed properties 
can be explanatory. Nonetheless, perhaps some discomfort with distributed prop-
erties as an explanans for the point features lingers in the reader. Can we account 
for this discomfort? Salience admits of degree. And in this case there is a reason-
ably precise way of articulating a scale according to which we can distinguish the 
robustly salient from the weakly salient. As a rough quantitative basis for a scale 
of salience, one might consider what alternative focus markings must be ruled out 
pragmatically. For our example, we must rule out alternative readings such as.
(7) This point is red because the surface is polka-dotted red on  [white]F.
(8) This point is red because the surface is [polka-dotted]F red on white.
A successful explanation that is invariant under differences of emphasis, and does 
not exhibit any focus sensitivity whatsoever, would score high on this salience scale. 
For example, in the case where a surface is uniformly one colour, the following 
explanation is highly salient.
(9) This point is red because the surface is uniformly red.
Different focus markings do not change the truth value of (9). On the other hand, an 
explanation where an alternative reading must be ruled out for the explanation to be 
successful exhibits less salience. On this scale, (6) exhibits less salience in its situa-
tion than (9) exhibits in its situation.
1 3
Synthese 
Moving beyond toy examples of explanans such as being polka-dotted red on 
white is not straightforward. A global property distributed over the extension of an 
extended simple, for example, typically would not be expressed by a term with suf-
ficient complexity to allow for differences of stress to induce semantic differences 
similar to those induced by ‘being polka-dotted  [red]F on white’ and ‘being polka-
dotted red on  [white]F’. But analogous semantic differences may be induced by the 
context of the explanation. In the context of explaining a local feature, the interlocu-
tors take some aspect of the distributed property seriously as playing a significant 
role in the explanation. That is to say, they take some aspect of the distributional 
facts to be more salient, and other aspects less salient.
So goes a sketch of one approach to salience. Let me make a few disclaimers. 
I do not claim that this smattering of focus theory will provide a general theory 
of salience. I also have offered a guideline for differentiating degrees of salience 
within this approach. The guideline considers alternative focus markings with robust 
semantic effect. But I do not claim that such considerations are the only, or the 
best, way of differentiating degrees of salience. Instead, I offer these sketches as an 
approach to salience that tracks certain intuitions I have in our target cases. Finally, 
it may be worth emphasizing that the discussion of focus sensitivity in this section 
is not intended to suggest a solution for the distributionalist, but instead to suggest 
a semantic model for characterizing salience success and failure. My claim is that 
differences in linguistic stress induce semantic differences relevantly similar to the 
semantic differences induced by differences in salience. This observation is com-
patible with there being disagreements over whether a purported explanation has 
sufficient salience. Distributionalists might find that ‘That is red because it is polka-
dotted  [red]F on white’ exhibits sufficient salience; others might disagree; the discus-
sion in this section aims to bring out a clear way of articulating the disagreement.15
15 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer who raises concerns with the discussion of focus sensitivity in this 
section. They write that “the author claims that certain ‘because’-claims that the distributionalist is com-
mitted to appear problematic due to their low salience, but with the correct focus-markings, they can 
be given an acceptable reading.” The reviewer raises several worries arising from this claim. For exam-
ple, although the focus-marked ‘That is red because it is polka-dotted  [red]F on white’ is acceptable, 
the reviewer finds the non-focus-marked ‘That is red because it is polka-dotted red on white’ to be also 
acceptable. The reviewer finds some of the sentences discussed to be not clearly cases of explanatory 
uses of ‘because’ since they may be epistemic cases. Finally, the reviewer notes that the claim overgen-
erates, since it counts ‘This is red because this is round and  [scarlet]F’ as acceptable but conjunctive 
facts make for poor grounds. In response, I welcome the opportunity to clarify and emphasize the inten-
tions of this section of the paper, which is not to show that there are acceptable readings of distribution-
alist explanations. Personally, I find such explanations to exhibit salience failure. Competent language 
users can disagree whether the non-focused-marked sentence ‘That is red because it is polka-dotted red 
on white’ is acceptable, provided there is not robust disagreement that the sentence exhibits less sali-
ence than its focus-marked counterpart. The observation is also compatible with purported explanations 
exhibiting different degrees of salience yet failing as explanations for other reasons – for example that the 
sentence employs an epistemic sense of ‘because’ or that the purported explanation flouts other require-




How might a distributionalist respond? Those who have appealed to such properties, 
so to give to monists or friends of extended simples an account of qualitative hetero-
geneity, or to give to presentists a response to the truthmaker objection, or to provide 
an analysis of change, might well reject altogether the requirement of salience for 
metaphysical explanation. Indeed, they might take the above considerations to show 
only that anyone’s discomfort with distributed properties is flowing from the cogni-
tive demands of explanation. We need to draw attention to certain features of the 
fundamental facts so to engender understanding of how they ground other facts. But 
(the response might continue) metaphysical explanation is simply a determination 
relation that imposes a partial ordering on the ontology of facts. We ought to distill 
cognitive considerations from an account of objective ontological structure. In this 
way, distributionalists might use the above discussion so to provide an error theory 
of their opponents’ mistake.
The paper is directed towards those who, like me, feel discomfort with distributed 
properties as the explanans for their associated point features. I have suggested that 
this discomfort is not due to the distributed property failing to adequately determine 
the point features. And I have offered attenuated salience as an analysis of the dis-
comfort. If you feel discomfort, and you agree with the analysis, then you have a 
reason to view salience as a value for assessing metaphysical explanations no less 
than other kinds of explanations.
To note that a distributed property exhibits attenuated salience is not to say that 
the property has insufficient salience to adequately explain the associated point fea-
tures. Although we have a way of specifying a scale so to assess degree of sali-
ence, there is no easy line of demarcation between the sufficiently salient and the 
nonexplanatory. The assessment whether distributed properties offer sufficient sali-
ence to be explanatory is a decision requiring consideration of the degree of sali-
ence relative to other costs and benefits of the proposal. These considerations may 
well conflict and so an assessment requires careful weighing of the value of salience 
against these other values. That is to say, the assessment requires not mere decision 
but judgment.16
Let’s step back just a little. Recall that Raven raises a challenge for those ‘separa-
tists’ who would distinguish metaphysical explanations from the worldly facts which 
back such explanations. Such separation would allow for facts about the instantia-
tion of distributed properties to obtain independently of our interests, purposes and 
background beliefs, while viewing the employment of such facts in metaphysical 
explanations as sensitive to our epistemic situation. Opposed to separatists are the 
16 As Feinberg (1970, p. 141) notes in another context. I do not claim that these observations could 
vindicate every variant of distributionalism. Specific uses of distributional properties in metaphysical 
explanations face specific challenges. For example, Sider (2007) argues that priority monism is incom-
patible with our best account of intrinsic properties. For discussion, see Trogdon (2009, 2010) and Skiles 
(2009). And Tallant and Ingram (2012a, b) and Corkum (2014) argue that there are reasons specific to 
presentism why presentists should not use distributional properties as truthmakers for past claims; for 
discussion see Cameron (2013) and Green (2017).
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unionists, who hold that mere citation of the worldly facts provides metaphysi-
cal explanations. The citation of facts is minimally evaluable by cognitive values 
and so, if citation is explanation, then such explanations are relatively insensitive 
to our epistemic situation. The challenge for separatists, as Raven characterizes it, 
is to show that grounds do not generally provide any kind of explanation. But we 
can concede to unionists that mere citation may provide a minimal explanation. The 
question is not whether an explanation is provided but whether the provided expla-
nation is satisfactory. I’ve considered a case where facts about the instantiation of 
distributed properties are called to play the role of explanans in the explanation of 
facts about the corresponding point features. The distributional facts determine the 
point facts. But suppose you share my discomfort with distributional facts as expla-
nations of the point facts. Then you have a reason to reject the grounding facts in 
this case as providing a satisfactory metaphysical explanation. And suppose further 
that you agree with my analysis of this discomfort in terms of attenuated salience. 
Then you have reason to hold that, although a purported explanans determines its 
corresponding explananda, it can fail to provide a good metaphysical explanation, if 
it lacks sufficient salience.
Okay, but should we care? One might after all agree that distributional facts are 
insufficiently salient to the point facts, so that the explanations canvassed in §3 fail 
as explanations, but view this explanatory failure as being of little concern to the 
metaphysician. Here is a picture of metaphysical inquiry that might support this 
view. The primary goal of metaphysics is to identify what grounds what.17 Once 
we have identified the grounding facts, and the facts about how these grounds deter-
mine the determine the derivative facts, we have achieved our goal. The conveyance 
of these facts, and thereby the explanation of the derivative facts by means of the 
grounding facts, is of secondary concern. And tracking and accommodating our own 
cognitive difficulties in appreciating what grounds what, lies outside the purview of 
metaphysical inquiry per se.
Apply this picture to distributionalism. Notice that a distributionalist might be 
either a separatist or an unionist. A distributionalist who is also a separatist might 
concede that, although the distributional facts determine the local facts, distribu-
tional facts might nonetheless provide a poor explanation of local facts. But a the-
orist who is both a distributionalist and an unionist would reject the requirement 
of sufficient salience for adequate explanations, on the grounds that metaphysical 
explanations are objective and insensitive to cognitive values. Such a theorist would 
be unmoved by the considerations of this paper. Indeed, they might well view these 
considerations as providing a defensive manoeuvre. If you find the global distri-
butional facts to be insufficiently salient to local facts, you are (the defense goes) 
17 For example, this appears to be the view of Schaffer (2009) and Sider (2011). For criticism of some 
aspects of this picture, see for example Barnes (2017) and Mikkola (2017). Sider (2017) and Schaffer 
(2017) respond in part by clarifying: the identification of what grounds what, plays a central role in meta-
physics but is not the sole goal of metaphysical inquiry.
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mistaking the limitations of your cognition of the explanation for shortcomings in 
the explanation itself.18
I do not know how to argue against this picture of metaphysics. But let me close 
by sketching a rival. The aim of metaphysical inquiry is not merely to identify what 
grounds what, but to use such facts with the goal of explaining the derivative facts. 
Metaphysics aims at truth, of course; but metaphysics also aims at understanding. 
On this picture, we ought to take seriously, as part of the metaphysical endeavour, 
the cognitive evaluation of metaphysical explanations.
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